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Abstract: The paper surveys George W. Bush s political thinking, his election 
strategies, and the domestic policy initiatives that have been pursued. Although 
there are claims that the character of the Bush White House has been dictated by 
the president's deep religious faith and his associa1ions wi1h the "Christian right, " 
there are significant theological and political differences between Bush and reli-
gious conservatives. Instead, the roots of Bush 's thinking are robe found in the 
forms of conservatism that were pioneered and developed by Republican state gov-
ernors during the Latter half of 1he 1990s. In contras/ with both the Congressional 
Republicans and the Christian right who had often adopted abrasive forms of di.~­
course, gubernatorial conservatism talked of "inclusion," addressed longstanding 
Democratic issues such as education, and emphasized the proactive role that gov-
ernment could play. This allowed the Bush-Cheney ticket to make electoral inroads 
among groupings that had traditionally been loyal to the Democrats. 
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Much has been made of George W. Bush's relationship with God. 
Despite the strictures of the First Amendment, which prohibited the pas-
sage of federal law "respecting the establishment of a religion," all presi-
dents have professed their fai th and played their part as "high priest" in 
the American "civil religion" that binds America's history, character and 
destiny together with representations of God's purpose. However, Bush 
seems to speak of that purpose and Jesus Christ in more open, personal, 
and committed te1111s than many of his predecessors. When asked by a 
I. Some of the themes discussed in this urticle ure explored further in my forthcoming book, George W 
Bush, Sex and the Moral Agenda (Manchester University Press, 2006). 
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reporter during the 2000 election campaign about his favorite philoso-
pher, he replied: "Christ, because he changed my heart."2 
To an extent, Bush's affirmations of faith recall President Jimmy 
Carter's words and statements. Carter's victory in the 1976 Democratic 
primaries and subsequent capture of the White House created substantial 
press interest in evangelical forms of worship and the Southern Baptist 
Convention. As the Baptist Standard has noted, Carter, a devout Baptist, 
introduced the term "born again" into the vocabulary of politics.3 How-
ever, there is a significant difference between Carter and Bush. Evangel-
ical Protestantism seemed to add a sense of innocence to representations 
of Jimmy Carter's character and personality. Many of the news reports 
were tinged with a degree of condescension and some amusement. 
Carter's comment in his November 1976 interview with Playboy that he 
had committed adultery in his heart many times by looking at women 
other than his wife seemed to be the remark of a political and moral inno-
cent.4 In contrast, George W. Bush's ties with the evangelical tradition 
have almost always portrayed in a more threatening way. 
Prophetic Spokesman 
Bush, it is said, is dtiven by messianic notions of faith. Indeed, some 
have suggested that in contrast with earlier presidents who have spoken 
as petitioning supplicants, Bush represents himself "as a prophetic 
spokesman for God."5 His statements seem to be underscored by a belief 
that he can not only discern but express God 's will. Those who talk in 
these terms were quick to seize upon claims by Nabil Shaath of the Pales-
tinian Authority that Bush had been guided by God when he ordered the 
2. Quo1ed in John Dickerson (2005), "God vs. geeks: GOP evangelicals ligh1 in1ellectuals over Harrie! 
Miers," Slate, October 5, www.slale.com/id/2127492/ 
3. Greg Warner (2000), "Jimmy Carter says he can ' no longer be associated' with the SBC," Baptist Stan-
dard, Oc1ober 23, www.bapliststandard.com/2000/!0_23/pages/caner.html 
4. Playboy.com (2005), Tire Playboy Interview: /11 111eir Own Words, 
www.playboy.com/worldofplayboy/in1erviews/ 
5. David Domke and Kevin Coe (2004), "How Bush's God-talk is different," Belie/net, 
www.beliefnet.com/story/ I 59/story _15962_ 1.html 
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March 2003 invasion of Iraq.6 Some European observers have employed 
particularly harsh tones, tying Bush's faith to a broadening and deep-
ening of the American "civil religion": 
The United States of America no longer needs to call upon God; it is God, and those 
who go abroad to spread the light do so in the name of a celeslial domain ... The presi-
dency is turning into a priesthood. So those who question George Bush's foreign policy 
are no longer merely c1itics; they are blasphemers.7 
Although comments such as this are principally directed towards the 
administration's pursuit of the "war on terror," there have been sugges-
tions that domestic strategy has also been guided by religious considera-
tions. From this perspective, White House policy towards issues such as 
abortion, sex education, and gay rights, and the nomination of federal 
judges have been largely dictated by faith : 
To see what's new and dangerous about Bush's approach to religion, you have Lo look 
beyond the president's copious prayers and exhortations ... From school-prayer guidel-
ines issued by the Department of Education to faith-based ini tiatives to directives from 
virtually every federal agency, there's hardly a place where Bush hasn't increased both 
the presence and the potency of religion in American government.x 
Rededication 
At first sight, there is much in all of this . Bush's personality and char-
acter, or at least their public constructions, have been shaped around 
themes that have close associations with evangelical Protestantism. 
Although Bush himself has generally shrunk from using the phrase "born 
again," and his embrace of a deeper faith was more a staggered process 
than a defining moment, the president's life story seems to rest upon a 
narrative that is structured around a repudiation of the past and a time of 
redemption. 
6. BBC News (2005). "White House denies Bush God claim," BBC News, October 61", 
http://news.bbc.eo.uk/2/hi/americas/43 17498.stm. Nabil Shaath's claim was denied by the president's press 
spokesman. 
7. George Monbiot (2003), "America is a religion," The Guardian , July 29, 
www.guardian.eo.uk/comment/storyf0,. 1007741 ,00.html. 
8. Chris Mooney (2003), " W. 's Christian Nation: How Bush promotes re lig ion and erodes the separation of 
church and state," The American Prospect, January 6, www.prospect.org/printfV 14/6frnooney-c.html 
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Bush was always a churchgoer. After being raised in his parents' Epis-
copal tradition, he joined a Presbyterian congregation, and then when he 
and Laura Bush were man-ied in 1977 he became a member of the United 
Methodist Church. However, notwithstanding this, the most widely cir-
culated accounts of Bush's youth stress stories of drink, allegations of 
drug abuse, the frequent use of coarse language, a violent temper, a seem-
ingly sporadic commitment to service in the Texas Air National Guard, 
and failed business efforts. There have been frequent questions about the 
seriousness of his early church membership. It certainly did little to cmb 
the personal excesses for which he was known. According to a sympa-
thetic portrait, Bush "acted like a wretch, blind to grace."9 
His talks with Billy Graham, the crusading evangelist, during the mid-
1980s were pivotal. As Bush himself later recalled: "Reverend Graham 
planted a mustard seed in my soul, a seed that grew over the next year . .. 
It was the beginning of a new walk where I would recommit my heart to 
Jesus Cbrist." 10 Alongside Graham's ministries, Bush's participation in a 
community Bible study (CBS) group was also important. It led him to 
abandon alcohol, curb hi s former indulgence and rededicate his life: 
It was a scriptural boot camp: an intensive, yearlong study of a single book of the New 
Testament, each week a new chapter, with detailed reading and di scussion in a group of 
J 0 men ... The CBS program was a turning point for the future president ... CBS 
was ... part of what has since come to be called the "small group" faith movement. It's 
a baby-boomerish mix of self-help, self-discipline, group therapy ... and worship. 
Whatever, it worked ... It was "goodbye Jack Daniels, he llo Jesus," said one friend 
from those days. 11 
The extent of Bush's earlier hedonism has perhaps been exaggerated. 12 
However, it serves an important purpose insofar as only those who have 
fallen can be redeemed. Redemption through self-development, dedica-
tion, a disciplined striving for improvement and personal experience of 
God's forgiveness ties Bush to the evangelical denominations. 13 As 
9. Paul Kengor, God and George W 811slr (New York: RcganBooks, 2004) 24. 
I 0. Quoted in Alex Johnson (2004), " Bush - burn again, or not? The president has never clarified his con-
version narrative," MSNBC, September 28, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6 I I 57 19/ 
11. Howard Fineman, " Bush and God," Newsweek, March 10, 2003. 
12. Bush himself suggests that many of the repon s are only "rumormo ngeiing" (George W. Bush, A Charge 
to Keep [New York, William Morrow, 1999] 133). 
13. Belieji1e1 (2000), A Librm)' of Q11oratio11s 011 Religio11 and Politic.< hy Geo1ge W. /J11s'1, 
www.resource.beliefnet.com/story/33/story _3345 _ l .html 
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Charles W. Colson, a Nixon White House aide who, following his turn 
towards evangelical faith, led Prison Fellowship Mini stries put it: "I 
think most of us recognize him as a guy who sure has the same orthodox 
beliefs we do." 14 
Politics 
As Howard Fineman noted in a Newsweek portrait, Bush's turn towards 
faith also offered di stinct political advantages: 
Bush uirned to the Bible to save his marriage and his family. But was he also thinking 
of smoothing his path to elective office? We' 11 never know for sure. But he knew the 
political landscape of his near-native Texas. He knew that, by 1985, the South had risen 
to take control of the GOP, and that evangelical activism and clout was rising with it -
indeed had been instrumental in making it possible. He also knew that his father 's way 
- Episcopalian reserve, moderation on cultu ral issues, close ties to back East - was a 
tough sell. 15 
The path that Bush followed allowed him to construct a working rela-
tionship with the Christian right, the network of culturally conservative 
individuals and groupings that was largely, but not exclusively, built 
around white evangelical Protestants and was from about 1980 onwards 
an important political constituency and, at times, the Party's kingmaker. 
In his father's 1988 presidential election campaign, Bush was, together 
with Doug Wead, a former Assembly of God minister, an associate of tel-
evangelists Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker and a member of the Amway 
products network, responsible for liaison. 16 As Wead later recalled, "his 
father wasn' t comfortable dealing with religious types ... George knew 
exactly what to say, what to do." 17 As his political career developed, Bush 
continued to talk in terms that had a resonance with evangelicals and the 
activists of the Christian right. As The New York Times later noted, Bush 
14. Alan Cooperman (2004), "Bush leaves specifics of his faith to speculation," MSNBC News, September 
16, hllp: //msnbc.msn.com/id/6014 570/. 
15. Howard Fineman, "Bush and God," News1veek, March 10, 2003, 22. 
16. Bi ll Minutaglio, First Son: George \¥. Bush and the Bush Family Dynasty (New York: Random House 
1999) 212-13. 
17. Fineman 22. 
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had an intuitive understanding of the words, phrases and forms of dis-
course that had a particular meaning for evangelicals and far-reaching 
significance for the Christian right. 18 
The process of political courtship paid dividends. With the backing of 
many associated with the Christian right, Bush won the South Carolina 
primary in February 2000. His victory in the Palmetto state created an all-
important sense of momentum that left his principal rival, Senator John 
McCain, far behind. As John White has recorded, Christian right organi-
zations and their grassroots supporters, many of whom saw moral values 
as the principal campaign issue, helped Bush consolidate his hold over 
the nomination during the later Republican primaries and caucuses. In 
Georgia, for example, 37 per cent of primary voters saw moral values as 
the most important issue. Bush won with 70 per cent of the vote. 19 The 
relationship between Bush and the Christian right continued to be close 
after Inauguration Day and was strengthened still further after the 
September 11 attacks amidst suggestions that Bush had been "chosen" to 
lead during a period of exceptional turmoil. Faith structured the working 
life and culture of the White House. David Frum has recalled that the 
very first words that he heard, on joining the White House as a presiden-
tial speechwriter in 2001, were "missed you at Bible study." Attendance 
at these gatherings, he has recorded, was "if not compulsory, not quite 
uncompulsory, either."20 There have also been impromptu acts of wor-
ship. According to an account by Stephen Mansfield, a Palm Sunday ser-
vice was organized on Air Force One as it returned from El Salvador: 
There were nearly forty officials crammed into the plane's conference room. Condole-
ezza Rice, an accomplished classical musician , led the worship. Karen Hughes gave the 
lesson, and the entire affair ended with the singing of "Amazing Grace" and hugs and 
kisses as a sign of Clu·istian fellowship.21 
Furthermore, some individuals drawn from the Christian right were 
rewarded with administration positions. For example, Kay Coles James, 
who served formerly as a dean at Regent University (which was estab-
18. David D. Kirkpalrik (2005), "The crisis of the Bush code," The New York Times, October 9, 
www.nytimes.com/2005/ l 0/09/weekinreview/09kirk.html ?ex= I 12952 1 600&en=fc3ca77e96e5dd69&ei=507 
19. John Kenneth White, The Values Divide: American Politics a11d Culture i11 Tra11sitio11 (New York, 
Chatham House Publishers, 2003) 89-90. 
20. David Frum, '!lie Right Ma11: The S111prise Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Random House, 
2003) 3-4. 
2 1. Stephen Mansfield, The Faith of Ge01ge W. Bush (New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 2003) 119. 
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Jished to offer "Christian leadership" and where Pat Robertson, one of the 
'founding fathers' of the Christian right, serves as Chancellor) and as 
senior vice president of the Family Research Council, was appointed 
djrector to the federal government's Office of Personnel Management.22 
Tim Goeglein from Indiana and a member of the Lutheran Church - Mis-
souri Synod, was appointed as White House deputy di.rector of the Office 
of Public Liaison so as to provide communication between the White 
House and the Christian right organizations. He works closely with 
movement figures such as Jay Sekulow of the American Center for Law 
and Justice, who through daily radio show and internet appeals com-
mands a regular audience of about 1.5 million.23 
Subtleties 
Although Bush employed the language and discourse of the Christian 
right and built upon his associations with them, his relationship with 
Christian conservatives has not, however, always been as straightforward 
as it may at first sight appear. While serving as Texas governor, Bush had 
often disappointed many pro-life activists. Indeed, as the 2000 presiden-
tial election approached, there was uncertainty about his prospects of 
winning the movement's support. 24 One very experienced observer, John 
C. Green of the University of Akron, was initially skeptical about Bush's 
chances: 
I don't think that George W. Bush would be the favored candidate of the Religious 
Right under any circumstances ... He's too moderate for them. He could be their 
second choice, or their third or four1h or fifth. 25 
22. Chris Mooney (2003), "W.'s Christian Nacion: How Bush promotes religion and erodes the separation 
of church and state," Tire American Prospec1, January 6, www.prospcct.org/prinl/V 14/6/mooncy-c.html. 
23. Lorrninc Wocllcrl (2005), " Inside Bush's Supreme rerun: in fight for the com1s, behind the scenes players 
are uniting the right," Bminess Week, April 25, www.busincsswcck.com/magazinc/contcn1/05_ 17/b3930120.htm 
24. Bush had, however, won Pal Robertson's implicit backing at an early stage. During the 1996 Repub-
lican national convention, he told an interviewer: "Our people think he's absolutely marvelous ... He would 
make a super president. He really would. We'd be tluilled to see somebody like that hit the ticket one of these 
days." (Quoted in Wayne Slater, "Hilling his stride: Texas governor's high visibility makes impression in San 
Diego," The Dalla.~ Morning News, August 14, 1996, 19A) 
25. Quoted in Stephen Mansfield, The Faith of George W Bush (New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 2003) 112. 
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Green 's forecast proved mistaken. Nearly all the most influential names 
on the Christian right threw their weight behind Bush in the contest to 
secure the Repubhcan presidential nomination. Nonetheless, the com-
ment highlights the differences between Bush and the Christian right. 
Bush's faith has a more subtle, temperate, and restrained character than 
that of many on the Christian right. It lacks the theological discipline and 
certainty or the associations with politics that characterize the beliefs of 
those most closely involved with the movement. While echoing their 
vocabulary, and sharing some of their more immediate goals, he has dis-
tanced himself, as both Texas governor and US president, from some of 
the Christian right's defining principles. Whereas President Ronald 
Reagan committed himself to the overturning of the 1973 Roe ruling that 
established abortion, in at least certain circumstances, as a constitutional 
right, Bush instead spoke in more elliptical terms about a "culture of 
life." He only backed legislative measures, such as the ban on "partial-
birth abortion" that commanded majority public support. Similarly, in 
contrast with much of the Christian right, Bush endorsed the legal provi-
sion of civil unions and domestic partnerships for same-sex couples 
while stressing the sanctity of marriage as a union of a man and a woman. 
Although the campaigning efforts of the Christian right played an impor-
tant part in securing Bush's November 2004 re-election victory, he 
quickly stated that the proposed Federal MarTiage Amendment, which 
would incorporate a prohibition of same-sex marriage in the US Consti-
tution, had no prospect of passage through Congress and therefore had no 
place on his policy agenda.26 There were also significant differences 
between much of the Christian right and the foreign policy initiatives 
adopted by the White House. Despite the absence of religious freedom in 
China and the country's policy of coerced abortions, the Bush adminis-
tration sought a continued improvement of trade relations. While many 
on the Christian right had deep reservations about the prospect of an 
Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip and the West Bank, the White 
House encouraged territorial concessions.27 In October 2005, the nomina-
26. The Washi11gto11 Po.<I (2005). Trnnscript or Bush Interview, Junuary 16, WWW. washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/art iclcs/A I 2570-2005Jan 15_3.html 
27. CBS News (2003), "Zion's Christian soldiers," June 8, 
www.cbsncws.com/stori es/2002/ I 0/03/60rni n utes/mai n524 268.sht ml 
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tion of White House counsel Harriet Miers to the US Supreme Cou1t had 
to be withdrawn in the wake of anger among conservative opinion for-
mers. 
Faith 
Despite his associations with the movement, there is therefore some dis-
tance between Bush and the Christian 1ight. How, then, should his faith 
be understood? Firstly, there is a belief in Providence. In Bush's com-
ments and statements, events serve a purpose and are following a path 
that is guided by God: 
I have moments of doubt, moments of pride, and moments of hope. Yet, my faith helps 
a lot ... "Thy will be done," is life's gu ide. In thi s hectic world, there is something 
incredibly reassuring in the belief that there is a divine plan that exceeds a ll human 
plans.28 
Indeed, Bush spoke of being called to seek the presidency. He is said to 
have told James Robison , a minister: "I've heard the call. I believe God 
wants me to run for President."29 Notions such as these gained particular 
cmTency in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Bush's supporters, 
and the President himself, appeared to suggest that he had been placed in 
office by God to take the nation forward during a critical period of its his-
tory. Lt. General William "Jerry" Boykin, who was promoted to deputy 
undersecretary of defense in the summer of 2003, spoke in certain terms: 
Why is this man in the White House? The majority of Americans did 
not vote for him. Why is he there? And I tell you this morning that he's in 
the White House because God put him there for a time such as this.30 
At times, Bush himself seemed to share these sentiments. According to 
a Time magazine report, "Privately, Bush talked of being chosen by the 
grace of God to lead at that moment."31 
28. Quoted in Paul Kengor 36. 
29. Quoted in Steven Waldman (2004), "Heaven sent: does God endorse George Bush?," Slate.co111, Sep-
!ember 13, www.sla!e.com/id/2106590/ 
30. Lisa Myers and !he NBC Investigative Unit (2003),"Top terrorist hunter"s divisive views," MSNBC, 
October 15, www.msnbc.com/news/980764.asp 
3 1. Quoted in Waldman. 
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However, remarks such as this should be set in context. Bush has also 
spoken in more humble terms and has been less certain about the will of 
God than many observers suggest. According to Richard Land of the 
Southern Baptist Convention, Bush said to him: "I believe that God 
wants me to be president, but if that doesn' t happen, it's OK."32 These 
comments are tied to a more generalized sense of uncertainty. When 
asked about gays and homosexuality, the president distanced himself 
from many associated with the Christian tight by refusing to make a 
moral judgment. Citing the New Testament he said: 
I am mindful chat we' re all sinners, and I caution those who may try to take the speck 
out of their neighbor's eye when they got a log in the ir own.33 
Bush also invariably emphasizes the limits to knowledge and the inability 
of humanity to understand events and processes. Furthermore, although 
much has been made of Bush's belief in a "divine plan," trust in Provi-
dence extends far beyond Bush. Indeed, it is in some respects a defining 
characteristic of the American experience. Other, perhaps most, presi-
dents (and figures such as Martin Luther IGng) have portrayed the US as 
a nation particularly blessed by God and the country 's victories and 
progress as a sign of thi s. 
Secondly, although there have been seemingly unguarded comments, 
such as the time when he appeared to suggest that heaven was not open to 
Jews and those of other faiths, Bush has generally expressed his commit-
ment to faith in broad, non-sectarian and ecumenical terms. Indeed, in an 
interview with NBC, he pulled back from his earlier remarks: 
My religion says that you accept Christ and you go to heaven. That was a statement that 
some interpreted that I said that l get to decide who gets to go to heaven. Governors 
don't decide who gets to go to heaven ... God decides who gets to go to heaven.34 
As Paul Kengor concludes, Bush is on doctrinal questions, "much more a 
liberal Methodist than an inflexible fundamentalist."35 Indeed, he often 
talks of his faith in generic terms. While often described as an "evangel-
32. Quoted in Waldman. 
33. Quoted in Kengor 107. 
34. Alan Cooperman (2004), "Bush leaves specifics of his faith to speculation,'' MSNIJC Ne111s, September 
16, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6014570/. 
35. Kengor 63. 
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ical," Bush has not defined his faith. Furthermore, even before the efforts 
to court moderate Islamic opinion in the wake of the September 11 
attacks, he ventw-ed beyond the Judeo-Christian tradition and, in at least 
some of his remarks, placed Islam on an equal footing with Christianity. 
In his 2001 inaugw-ation address, he referred to mosques alongside 
churches and synagogues.36 
Thirdly, in contrast with many associated with the Christian right, 
Bush has always distanced himself from proselytizing or the taking of 
faith beyond defined bounds. The role played by Billy Graham in Bush's 
turn to God may perhaps be significant. Although he was an evangelist 
with close ties to the political process, Graham never enrolled in the 
ranks of the Christian right.37 Albeit with hindsight, Graham regarded his 
earlier forays into politics and hi s ties to President Richard Nixon as a 
mistake. Indeed, Graham insisted upon a distinction between being an 
evangelical and "evangelism," which he saw as his calling. He associated 
himself with the American "civil religion" that tied faith together with the 
history and destiny of the US but eschewed more sectional forms of cam-
paigning for political objectives and goals. In distancing himself from the 
Christian right, he also emphasized the importance of an inclusive mes-
sage: 
lf J took sides in all these different divisive areas, l would cut off a great part of the 
people that T really want to reach. So I've felt that the Lord would have me just present 
the Gospel and stay out of politics.38 
Fourthly, despite Bush 's reluctance to understand or represent faith in 
overtly political terms, his has at the same time accepted the claims of 
those who asserted there should be closer ties between church and state. 
The concept of "compassionate conservatism" and proposals for the 
faith-based initiative that stemmed from it drew upon the work of conser-
vative social theorists such as Myron Magnet and Marvin Olasky. In 
books such as The Tragedy of American Compassion (1992) and 
36. The White House (2001 ), l'reside111 George W Bush'.r !11a11g11ra/ Address, January 20, www.white-
house.gov/news/inaugural-address.html 
37. His son, Franklin Graham, has had rather closer ties a ltl1ough he loo has maintained a degree of auto-
nomy. 
38. Cathy Lynn Grossman (2005), ' 'The gospel of Billy Graham: inclusion," USA 7oday, May 15, 
www.usatoduy.com/news/religion/2005-05- 15-graham-cover_x.htrn 
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Renewing American Compassion (1996), Olasky argued that provision 
for those in need, as a result of, for example, poverty, drug abuse, or 
mental illness, should be undertaken through faith-based and community 
organizations rather than government agencies. Such organizations 
could, Olasky asserted, offer more effective and lasting solutions. This 
was because they would work in a more personal and intensive way than 
government agencies. Individuals would not simply be regarded as mem-
bers of a particular category and staff would not simply be employees 
undertaking the duties associated with a job. Furthermore, he argued, the 
private provision of services would encourage a growth in active citizen-
ship whereby individuals would become more involved in their neigh-
borhoods and communities. 
"Compassionate conservatism" and the faith-based initiative flowed , 
in part, from the character of Bush's beliefs. They also, however, had a 
political significance. While the faith-based initiative met with a guarded 
response from the Christian right because of fears that religious bodies 
might lose their autonomy and be compelled to compromise their beliefs 
through, for example, changes to employment practices, the initiative did 
enable the White House to reach out towards two other groupings. 
Firstly, many of the black churches sought funding for charitable pro-
jects. Secondly, the notions associated with the initiative and the provi-
sion of aid for those in need struck a particular chord with Roman 
Catholics. As John Dilulio, who was appointed at the beginning of 
Bush 's first term to head the White House Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives noted, there was "a natural affinity between the 
ways in which the president talks about certain social policy issues and 
the way Catholics talk about those issues." According to Dilulio, Bush 's 
call to look first to faith-based institutions to build "armies of compas-
sion" was a "near-perfect embodiment of Catholic social teaching."39 
39. Adam Clymer (2001), "Bush is actively courting Catholic voters fo r 2004," The New York Times, June 
I, www.nytimes.com/200 I /06/0 I /poli tics/OJ CATH.html?ex= 11 34363600&en=9f094c9 J dc8a769 I &ei=5070 
&ex= l 057809600&en=f25 J 63a6f7a32fac&ei=5070 
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Not by Faith Alone 
Faith, however, only provides a partial guide to the character and con-
tours of Bush's thinking. Indeed, the focus by both European and Amer-
ican observers upon foreign policy and faith tends to distract attention 
away from the other factors that shaped Bush's thinking. While faith 
undoubtedly played a role in molding Bush's public image, and served as 
a "mobilizer" among grassroots activists, much of his thinking, the char-
acter of his electoral strategy, the nature of the domestic policy initiatives 
pursued by the administration, and the president's approach to moral and 
cultural issues were shaped by other processes. In particular, "W-ism," as 
it has been dubbed, was informed and structured by events, develop-
ments, and processes during the 1990s. 
Revolution and Impasse 
Firstly, Congressional Republicanism reached an impasse. Their election 
victoiies in November 1994 which placed Newt Gingrich in the Speaker's 
chair had been tied to the promise of a conservative revolution. The Contract 
with America, which had been signed by almost all Republican House candi-
dates offered an assurance that within the first hundred days of a Republican-
led House, there would be a vote on measures such as the Taking Back Our 
Streets Act, a law and order package, the Personal Responsibility Act, which 
would limit welfare provision, and the American Dream Restoration Act. 
Twenty three of the forty measures listed in the Contract were adopted. Most 
notably of all, the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppo1tunity Reconcili-
ation Act was passed and signed, albeit reluctantly, into law by President 
Clinton. It ended the system of welfare provision that had been initially estab-
lished in the 1930s and created, in its place, the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program, which imposed time limits on public 
assistance and introduced work requirements for recipient5. 
Nonetheless, despite the reforms and the changes in the character of 
the Clinton administration that the Republican electoral victories brought 
about, the Contract did not represent the beginning of a revolution. Some 
of the most significant legislative proposals included within it were not 
enacted. Most importantly of all, the Republican strategy of confronta-
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tion with the Clinton White House, which came to rest upon competing 
budget proposals, failed. Clinton's well-crafted intransigence, his pursuit 
of "triangulation" between the Republicans and the Congressional 
Democrats and the weight of public opinion, which supported the Presi-
dent in the budget crisis by a two-to-one majority, led the Republicans to 
back down. In the wake of this, they combined a pragmatic and incre-
mental approach to policy-making with an intensely partisan spirit that 
culminated in the impeachment proceedings against the president. It was 
not a course that reaped electoral rewards. The Republicans lost ground, 
particularly among women. Although, it is traditionally the president's 
party that suffers in mid-term contests, the Republicans not only failed to 
make gains in the 1998 elections, but lost seats. 
The Christian Right 
Secondly, the Christian right faced increasingly visible difficulties. 
Although some of the organizations that collectively constituted the 
movement, most notably Focus on the Family, established themselves as 
giant commercial empires, the movement made few policy gains. Most of 
the hopes and aspirations expressed in the Christian Coalition's 1995 
platform, Contract with the American Family, remained unfulfilled. 
Late-tenn abortions continued. Although there were sustained efforts to 
prohibit partial-birth abortion in both 1996 and 1997 which were backed 
by almost all Republicans and significant numbers of Democrats, the 
bills were vetoed by President Clinton. Looking back on the I 041h 
Congress (1995-97), Clyde Wilcox concluded: 
There's not very much of their agenda that happened ... Of all the major constituency 
groups that were part of the so-called Republican revolution, the Christian right once 
again finished last.40 
The movement also had structural weaknesses. The "peak" organization, 
the Christian Coalition, was financially over-committed. When Ralph 
Reed left his post as executive director in July 1997 so as to pursue a lob-
40. Clyde Wilcox, quoted in Congressional Quarrerly Weekly Report 54.44 (November 1996): 3 160. 
GEORGE W. B USH, GOD, AND POLITICS 59 
bying career, the Coalition was $3 million in debt.4 1 In the years that fol-
lowed, donations to the Coalition fell from $26.5 million in 1996 to an 
estimated $3 million in 2000.42 In 1999, the Internal Revenue Service 
questioned the Coalition's non-partisan character and refused to renew its 
tax-exempt status. 
Against this background, there was a sense of frustration or even 
despair among some cultural conservatives. Indeed, a number began to 
question the legitimacy or efficacy of the political process. The rise in 
President Clinton's approval ratings, his re-election victory in November 
1996, and the failure of social conservatives to secure their goals led 
some to talk in dramatic terms about the legitimacy of government. 
According to Rich~rd John Neuhaus: "It is not hyperbole to say that we 
are at a point at which millions of conscientious Americans are reflecting 
upon whether this is a legitimate regime ... That is the solemn moment 
we have reached."43 Others questioned the purpose of political engage-
ment. Against a background of seeming public indifference to Clinton's 
actions in the Lewinsky scandal, Paul Weyrich, who had played a pivotal 
role in founding the Free Congress Foundation, National Empowerment 
Television (NET), and the Moral Majority asserted that there was no 
longer a "moral majority." He spoke of a need for Christian conservatives 
to pull back from the political arena and instead "drop out of this culture, 
and find places ... where we can live godly, righteous and sober lives." 
Remoralization 
Thirdly, Bush's thinking and politics were shaped by the process of 
"remoralization." During the period between the mid-1960s and late 
1980s, cultural and demographic trends, most particularly seemingly 
unrestrained promiscuity, increasing illegitimacy, burgeoning abortion 
41. Leon Howell, "Ups and downs of the religious right - growing power," Christian Century April 19, 
2000. 
42. People for the American Way (2005), Right Wing Watch - Christian Coalition, 
www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx 'loid=4307#3 
43. Quoted in Jacob Hcilbrunn ( 1996), ' Neocon v. theocon: the new fault line on the right," The New 
Republic, December 30, 1996. 
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figures, and spiraling rates of family dissolution, had created a sense of 
impending crisis that required a forthright and resolute response by 
public officials. 
By the end of the 1990s, however, there had been a process of leveling 
off. Indeed, some cultural trends changed direction. Although the out-of-
wedlock birth rate almost tripled during the twenty year period between 
1970 and 1990, it plateaued from the mid-1990s onwards.44 At the same 
time, after a steady rise over a period of almost two decades, both the 
annual abortion total and the abortion rate (the number of abortions as a 
proportion of every 1,000 women aged 15-44), began to slide downwards 
from the late 1980s onwards. There seems to have been a particular shift 
among teenagers. Teenage pregnancy rates fell. The proportion of high 
school students who - according to surveys - have never had sexual inter-
course was 53 per cent in 2003. This is a rise from 46 per cent in 1991. 
The rise seems particularly marked among seniors. In 2003, 53 per cent 
said they never had sex compared to 33 per cent in 1991. At the same time, 
for those who were sexually active, the age of first sex also seems to have 
risen. 
"Remoralization" had consequences. lt contributed to the shift away 
from the use of abrasive and sometimes apocalyptic forms of discourse 
within the conservative movement and the Republican camp. In the orig-
inal 1994 edition of The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators , a hand-
book of key statistics, William J. Bennett, who served as Secretary of 
Education under President Reagan, had spoken in dramatic, perhaps 
threatening, terms: 
Over the past three decades we have experienced substantial social regression. Today 
the forces of social decomposition are challenging - and in some instances overtaking 
- the forces of social composition ... Unless these exploding social pathologies are 
reversed, they will lead to the decline and perhaps even to the fall of the American 
republic. 45 
Sentiments such as these and notions of an acute social crisis underlay 
the abrasive rhetoric and calls for the adoption of harsh forms of public 
44. US Department of Health and Human Services (2004), Health, United States, 
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus04trcnd.pdf#009, I I 7. 
45. William J. Benncu, Tile Index of Leading Cultural !11dicarors: Facts and Figures 011 the State of Amer-
ican Society (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994) 8. 
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policy that were adopted during the early and mid-1990s. However, in the 
introduction to the second edition of his book which was published in 
1999, Bennett acknowledged that there had been 
some truly remarkable gains ... Over the last few years, T have amended some of my 
own prior views ... It turns out that some social pathologies are less resistant to legisla-
tive action and political leadership than I once thought ... Our capacity for self-renewal 
is rare, and real.46 
Gubernatorial Conservatism and George W. Bush 
Against thi s background, there was a shift in the center of political 
gravity within the Republican Party. Increasingly, GOP state governors, 
including Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin, who was later to be 
appointed as Secretary of Health and Human Services in the Bush admin-
istration, George Voinovich of Ohio, George Pataki of New York, John 
Engler of Michigan and Christine Todd Whitman of New Jersey as well 
as both George W. (Texas) and Jeb Bush (who finall y secured the Florida 
governorship in the 1998 elections), led the way in the formulation and 
making of domestic policy. 
In part, the governors' contribution came down to a matter of political 
style. The remoralization process allowed them to move away from 
notions of acute social crisis. They adopted significantly less confronta-
tional, partisan and punitive forms of discourse than those in Congress 
and the Christian right. In addressing welfare issues, for example, the ref-
erences to "welfare queens" that had, at times, laced the GOP's rhetoric 
were supplanted by a plea to aid those who faced systematic forms of dis-
advantage. In place of this, gubernatorial conservatism sounded a posi-
tive and optimistic note. 
However, there were also differences of substance, and the Republican 
governors made their mark in terms of public policy. There was a will-
ingness to address issues that had often been neglected and a will to test a 
range of different approaches. At the same time, the apparatus of govern-
46. William Bennett, The illdax of Leading Cu/rural Indicators: American Society at tire Encl of the 20th 
Ce11t111y (New York: Broadway Books, 1999) 2-6. 
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ment was increasingly understood and represented in different tenns. 
Whereas the Reagan administration and the Contract with America had 
regarded government as, by definition, intrusive, inefficient, and expan-
sive and had sought to roll it back across a broad front, most of the gov-
ernors accepted the need for pro-active government and stressed the 
modernization of governmental provision. As George W. Bush himself 
put it: 
Government must be limited and focused, but it has an important job with in ils bounds. 
Government is too often wasteful and overreaching. But we must correct it and Ii mil it, 
not disdain it. J differ with those who want to dismantle government down lo the last 
paper clip.47 
Indeed, some of the governors increased spending on education, the envi-
ronment and the infrastructure. By 2000, the Cato Institute, one of the 
leading Washington conservative thinktanks, was markedly less enthusi-
astic about Republican gubernatorial rule than it had been some years 
earlier: 
The Republican governors tend to be touted as the GO P's policy stars, but . .. although 
there are a number of tax-cutting fiscal conservatives among the group, far too many of 
those top state executives have become big-government Republicans.4R 
Although generally regarded in broadly positive terms, George W. Bush 
was not spared from these strictures: 
Bush racked up a decent, but not a dazzling, protaxpayer record as governor ... But 
Bush could leave conservatives frustrated. He is a politician who seems to always want 
to keep everyone happy . . . his last budget grew by close to 10 percent, among the lar-
gest increases in the nation in 1999. He shoveled a record $2.1 billion of new money 
into the Texas schools and then declared himself " the education governor."49 
Alongside these moves, a number of Republican governors made system-
atic attempts to court the minority vote. It was, in part, a reaction to 
developments in California where the GOP had, during Pete Wilson's 
governorship, become associated with anti-immigrant sentiments leading 
to a further slippage in its share of the Latino vote. George W. Bush, in 
47. George W. Bush, A Charge to Keep 235. 
48. Stephen Moore and Stephen Slivinski (2001), "Fiscal Policy Report Card on America's Governors: 
2000," Policy Analysis, 39 1, Pcbruary 12, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa39 l .pdf, I. 
49. Moore and Slivinski 62. 
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particular, actively sought to shape a different approach. Boris Johnson, 
the idiosyncratic British Conservative MP, spoke in almost rapturous 
terms: 
Not only does he sloganise in Spanish. He speaks it . .. He makes long speeches fu ll of 
the test scores of Texan African-Americans; he calls in Hispanic adolescents who have 
learned to read successfully, and uses them as props for his orations.50 
Bush reached out to those who many other conservatives dismissed as the 
civil rights "industry." For example, he distanced himself from the cam-
paign for "English only" teaching that Republicans had pursued with a 
measure of success in California and over twenty other states: 
Those who advocate "English-only" poke a stick in the eye of people of Hispanic heri-
tage. "English-only" says me, not you. It says I count, but you do not. That is not the 
message of America.5 1 
In contrast with Bob Dole, the 1996 presidential candidate who had 
turned down an invitation four years earlier, Bush addressed the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People in July 2000. ln the 
speech he admonished Republicans by recording that "the party of Lin-
coln has not always carried the mantle of Lincoln" and he assured his 
audience that "strong civil rights enforcement will be a cornerstone of my 
administration. "52 
Lastly, most of the governors distanced themselves, at least to some 
extent, from the strident moral traditionalism of the Christian 1ight. The 
issues that defined cultural conservatism, most notably abortion and 
homosexuality, were downplayed. Indeed, Massachusetts Governor Bill 
Weld, New Jersey Governor Ch1istine Todd Whitman, and George 
Pataki of New York increasingly allied themselves with gay and lesbian 
campaigners. In New York State, an executive order banned discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation among state employees. They 
were also offered domestic partnership benefits. Later, in 2002, Pataki 
50. 8 . Johnson, "Hague seeks out Texan Bushman for magic formula," The Daily Te/egrap/1 February 13, 
1999. 
51. George W. Bush, A Charge to Keep 237. 
52. Michael Tomasky (2004), "Compassion is out," The American Pmspect Online Edition (Web Exc/11-
sive), July 12, www.prospect.org/web/page. ww?scction=root&namc=ViewWeb&articlcld=809 l 
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backed hate crimes legislation that included gays and lesbians and a law 
prohibiting discrimination in employment, education, housing, and 
public facilities .53 
Conclusion 
Although the Bush administration will be remembered principally for its 
actions in the wake of the September 11th attacks and commitment to 
interventionism abroad, it also made its mark on public policy within the 
US. Its approach to domestic policy was in large part shaped by guberna-
torial conservatism. Many uf the initiatives adopted by the administration 
and around which "W-ism" was built upon the approaches that had been 
adopted during the late 1990s at state level. There was a readiness to 
address issues, most notably education and health provision, which had 
traditionally been the prerogative of Democrats. Indeed, sections of the 
2002 No Child Left Behind Act were embraced more enthusiastically by 
Democrats than Republicans. Federal government spending rose to levels 
that had not have hitherto been countenanced by the Democrats "progres-
sive" wing. "W-ism" also used the language that had defined gubernato-
rial conservatism and distinguished it from the forms of discourse associ-
ated with Congressional Republicanism and the Christian right. There 
was a stress upon "compassion" and proactive government. There was an 
acute sensitivity, particularly once the strategy had been honed and mod-
ified by Karl Rove, his principal adviser, to the contours of public 
opinion and the attitudes of those groupings and constituencies that could 
prove pivotal to electoral victory. 
European observers have often had difficulties accounting for George 
W. Bush 's election successes. They have therefore tended to take refuge 
in explanations that rest upon electoral fraud in key swing states, a 
"super-mobilization" of white Christian evangelicals, a blind fear ofter-
rorist attack or even, according to Britain's Daily Mirror, the innate stu-
pidity of many American people. While memories of the September 11th 
53. Log Cabin Republicans (2005), Talking Points: Our Republican Allies Represent GOP's F11 111re, 
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attacks undoubtedly played a part in shaping the outcome of the 
November 2004 presidential contest, all these approaches to Bush and 
"W-ism" fail to acknowledge the Republicans' electoral skills and the 
party's ability to secure a measure of support from groupings that had tra-
ditionally been loyal to the Democrats. In 2004, there was a particularly 
marked swing to the Bush-Cheney ticket among women, those on the 
lowest rung of the educational ladder who had failed to graduate from 
high school and, according to some surveys, Latinos. There was also a 
further shift among non-Latino Catholic voters who had once formed the 
political, organizational, and cultural core of the Democratic Party. To an 
extent, this was part of a long-term process. Many "white ethnics" (such 
as Irish, Italian, and Polish Americans) felt much more of an identity with 
Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan than with those in the Democrats' 
ranks who talked of minority rights and appeared to make common cause 
with America's enemies. In November 2004, however, the shift gained 
greater momentum. It was pronounced even among the Democrats ' most 
conunitted backers. Despite John Kerry's Catholicism, ten per cent of 
white Catholic Democratic identifiers failed to back him. Fourteen per 
cent voted for Bill Clinton in 1996 but did not support the Massachusetts 
senator.54 
For Bush himself, these victories were short-lived. As 2005 pro-
gressed, the Republicans' political prospects looked increasingly bleak. 
Buoyed by its re-election victory, the president sought to spend political 
capital that he had not earned. The effects of the seeming quagmire in 
Iraq were compounded by Hurricane Katrina, the nomination of Harriet 
Miers to the US Supreme Court, and the mishandling of the port owner-
ship issue. Up until then, however, the administration had pursued a skill-
fully crafted course. Despite the emphasis that is usually placed upon 
Bush 's debt to the Christian right and fundamentalism, hi s political 
strategy owed much more to electoral exigencies and the need to court 
particular swing groupings. Just as Bill Clinton "tamed" the Democratic 
Party by bringing it towards center-ground politics and teaching it to 
understand the anxieties of the Republican voter, George W. Bush began 
a process of shifting his party towards a grasp of the Democratic voter's 
concerns and priorities. 
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